Teaching of Comparative Law and Comparative Law Teaching by Péteri, Zoltán
     		  
 		       
 		      !       "		#
 
 
I. C. Teaching of Comparative Law and Comparative Law Teaching
 
ZOLTÁN PÉTERI*  
 
Teaching of Comparative Law and Comparative Law 
Teaching 
 
 
Abstract. In the author’s view a dividing line can be drawn between, on the one hand, 
teaching comparative law as an independent discipline with its own history, methods, goals 
and functions, and the whole “curriculum” of legal studies based on a comparative attitude 
and carried out with the comparative method, on the other. The differences between the 
traditions and present-day practice of universities and law faculties in the Civil Law and the 
Common Law countries in this field may be interpreted as characteristic for the “style” of 
the entire legal systems belonging to one of these two big legal families. 
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Legal education has played an important role in the life of peoples for 
centuries as—according to an apt remark—it informs us about something 
substantial in regard to legal systems and the societies in which they operate. 
Legal education ”provides a window on the legal system. Here one sees 
the expression of basic attitudes about the law: what law is, what lawyers do, 
how the system operates or how it should operate. Through legal education 
the legal culture is transferred from generation to generation. Legal education 
allows us to glimpse the future of the society.”1 Thus, the topic that is on 
the agenda of the Congress of 2002 in Brisbane on the basis of the decision 
of the International Academy of Comparative Law deservedly commands 
the interest of the comparatists as the issue of the development or the 
comprehensive reform of legal education is on the agenda in not one or 
two countries but all over the world. This is true even if there are substantial 
differences in understanding the objectives and the methods of legal 
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1
 Merryman, John Henry: Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison. 
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 27., No. 3. (1975) 859. 
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education as well as in respect to organizing and financing it, and not only 
between particular countries but the traditions and present practices of 
whole legal families. So we can hardly speak about a uniform system or a 
universal paradigm of legal education. 
 The ongoing tendencies of globalization today set new and new challenges 
for the development of law and jurisprudence, and comparative law either in 
national or in international framework cannot be reserved from those challenges. 
While on the first International Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900) 
ideas concerning the establishment of a future world law were presented as 
mere hopes, nowadays—after many earlier failures and disappointments—
new and new substantial efforts have been devoted to the unification or, at 
least, the harmonization of law. In a growing number of countries, the 
activity of comparative lawyers provides the basis and the starting point for a 
legislation enacting legal rules that promote the accordance of domestic law 
with other legal systems or with a more general, widely accepted model. On 
the field of comparative jurisprudence, we witness a growing number of efforts 
that aim at clarifying the theoretical basis for the international unification and 
harmonization of law. As a consequence of this, comparative law shows signs 
of transformation: according to a summarizing evaluation, it is on the way 
to becoming basically “international” as opposed to remaining “national”. 
Comparative method that earlier served basically the development and the 
reform of the domestic legal system, and was applied in the traditional 
framework of domestic law, now adopts itself to the needs of the new 
tendencies aiming at the “globalization” of the law with a more comprehensive 
objective. Even legal thinking—mirroring these efforts—is directed towards the 
establishment of a universal jurisprudence that centres around a comparative 
approach and that encourages its representatives to apply new methods, to raise 
new questions, to assert new points of criticism preparing us to the formulation 
of a new paradigm of comparative jurisprudence. Thus, it is fully justified to 
include a topic in the programme of the 16th International Congress of 
Comparative Law that makes us conscious about the new challenges originating 
from the objective of the international unification and harmonization of law 
also in the field of legal education. Legal education situated in a human 
society going through continuous and profound changes cannot remain intact 
from the effects of these new challenges. Thus, if we repeatedly raise the 
issue of what, why, and how we teach it is to be taken as an “evergreen” 
question even if the efforts of reform—mainly in countries inclined to 
respecting their traditions—rarely meet the “official” concepts of governments. 
 Inquiries in this field fit into the framework of comprehensive initiatives 
that can be witnessed all over the world even with the aim of bringing the 
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teaching of comparative law to a new, higher level. The recognition that the 
knowledge of foreign laws plays an indispensable role in solving the 
problems raised by the ongoing globalization process has taken root both 
among the representatives of jurisprudence and legal practice. By now, not 
only the narrow, positivist-normativist view of law and the approach to 
solving legal problems on this basis that indisputably dominated the 19th 
century has been outdated for good, but also the “national” character of law 
and jurisprudence. Consequently, legal education can hardly limit itself to the 
teaching of domestic law (statutes, legal practice, jurisprudence) as issues raised 
on an international scale and situated in the framework of globalization require 
a supranational approach on an international level. Thus, the requirement 
that lawyers of the future are to be provided an education adapted to the needs 
of the modern world seems wholly justified. Of course, apart from raising 
repeatedly the issues of teaching comparative law, it involves in general the 
issues of law teaching and, possibly, a new approach to it as well. 
 The changes of the world set an increased challenge to the teachers of 
comparative law just and now, us age-old traditions of teaching the law will, 
by all probabilities, suit to the new demands. We have to find and use the 
methods mainly by ourselves on a relatively new, hardly more than a hundred 
years old field of research. The achievements of the international movement 
that unfolded in under the slogan of “droit comparé” or “comparative law” 
cannot overshadow the fact that—partly owing to the terminology regarded 
by many as misleading or, at least, unclear—we have to face several questions 
still to be clarified here. Here, the “common denominator” could be the fact 
that the comparative law movement gradually expanding to the whole world 
includes all of those who take the comparative analysis of law and the 
application of the comparative method to legal phenomena as their task. The 
“communis opinio doctorum” that—at least in its broad outline—can provide 
the guideline for a legal education that preserves the valuable achievements 
of the past but takes into account the needs of the new world can be 
established only with their contribution. It can be hardly contested that 
putting down this topic in the agenda was a useful initiative even in respect 
to promoting the international exchange of ideas and experiences.  
 
2. Right for the sake of the success of this endeavour and to avoid the 
“dialogue of the deaf”, it seems necessary to formulate some preliminary 
observations in regard to our topic. During the preliminary work following 
the earlier traditions and preceding the implementation of the general and 
the national reports to be submitted to the Congress, it became clear that 
the terminological vagueness concerning the concept of comparative law 
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(droit comparé), recognized and rightly criticised by many distinguished 
comparatists,2 manifested itself even in the I.C. topic of the International 
Congress of Comparative Law. For the topic—as it was pointed out by the 
general reporter of the topic in his notice addressed to the national reporters—
includes not one but two topics, although it is hard to draw a clear dividing 
line between them. The dividing line is seen by the general reporter as 
follows: the first topic deals with the actual teaching of comparative law in 
universities and in comparative law institutes, while the second deals with the 
impact of current global development on the teaching of comparative law.3 
 One can hardly agree with drawing the dividing line this way. As this 
dividing line—as it stands out clearly from the French title (l’enseignement 
du droit comparé et l’enseignement comparatif du droit) as opposed to the 
rather aphoristic English one (Teaching of Comparative Law and Comparative 
Law Teaching)—is supposed to indicate the indisputable difference between 
teaching in the universities a study or a discipline having become inde-
pendent under the name of “comparative law” or “droit comparé” on the one 
hand, and the transformation or the reform of the whole legal education in the 
spirit of comparativism, on the other. So one aspect of the topic centres 
around the (partly taxonomic, partly educational-political) issue whether 
there is anything like an independent discipline called comparative law (droit 
comparé) and whether it can be taught anyway, while the other aspect 
concentrates our attention to the question of how one could make legal 
education in the universities “comparative” in its character, how one could 
turn its “national” attitude into a “supra-national” one. 
 It can hardly be disputed that different understandings make it hard or 
even impossible for the general report to achieve the rightly expected synthesis 
of the national reports. For if we examine the topic only from a “technical” 
aspect, i.e. from the aspect of the methods applied in teaching comparative law 
considered as an independent discipline—as it is suggested by the general 
reporter—it necessarily pushes into the background—in our view—more 
important issue concerning the ways we could renew the whole legal 
education in a comparative, supra-national spirit based upon the recognized 
needs of our time. This aspiration—as it is indicated in the distinction between 
“Teaching of Comparative Law” and “Comparative Law Teaching”—concerns 
the “substantial” aspect of the problem well beyond the methodological one. 
Thus, it presupposes the rethinking of the basic issue of the whole legal 

 
2
 As to the concept, it was characterized as “strange” (Gutteridge), “unfortunate” 
(David) or “misleading”. 
 
3
 Moens, G. A.: Note to National Reporters on Comparative Law Teaching. 1 2. 
   	
 	    	      247 
  
education, of the considerations concerning the objectives of the whole 
“curriculum” of the law faculties well beyond the mere “technical” issues of 
education—in fact, mainly as opposed to them. If we remain faithful to our 
starting point which takes the issue of raising and answering the questions of 
“what?”, “why?”, and “how?” as a permanently current task, we can hardly 
reach any other conclusion but an examination of this topic of the Congress 
that expands to these substantial issues. 
 Yet, the difference in understanding the topic between the general reporter 
and ourselves raises—in our view—no inextricable difficulty. For according 
to the information gained from the general reporter, the questionnaire 
prepared by him and containing points preferred by him merely provides 
guidelines for national reporters. This allows us to follow the interpretation 
that we find adequate in formulating the national report. So we sum up our 
views not only concerning the methodological issues of the teaching of 
comparative law (droit comparé) considered as an independent discipline 
but also in respect to its renewal in comparative spirit—touching upon the 
basic objectives of legal education. 
 
 
II. 
 
3. The application of the comparative method in the 19th century—as it is 
well known—yielded remarkable results in many fields of scientific study. 
Although in this respect the study of law showed signs of backwardness 
not only compared to natural sciences but the study of language as well, 
the application of the comparative method proved to be a useful analytic 
tool; and not only in supporting the legal practice but also in the study of 
law as well. As a consequence of this, the opinion that comparative law 
(droit comparé) is not only the application of the comparative method on 
the world of law but also an integrated system of knowledge that can 
legitimately claim to be ranked as an independent discipline named the 
science of comparative law was put forward.4 It is also well known that 
listing the arguments supporting or refuting the claims concerning the nature 
of comparative law as being a method or a discipline became a favoured 
topic in the relevant literature.5 Although by this time these disputes have 

 
4
 This claim is best expressed by the German term “vergleichende Rechtslehre”.  
 
5
 These disputes intensified especially in connection with the appearance and spreading 
of socialist law and jurisprudence, and often led to the denial of the comparability of 
legal systems belonging to contrasting social formations. 
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lost their earlier, often passionate or even personal intonation, the question 
whether the application of the comparative method as a kind of “panacea” on 
legal phenomena can bring new scientific findings unattainable by other 
methods remained current. Thus, the question is whether the comparative 
activity is characterised by specific criteria that, based upon the peculiarities 
of the subject and the method, may qualify it as an independent kind of 
knowledge, viz. an independent discipline. And, if the answer goes in the 
positive, where one could find the place of this “comparative jurisprudence” 
in the system of the legal sciences. 
  Answers to the questions formulated above were given in the 19th 
century in the English- and the German-speaking world within the framework 
of the comparative and historical inquiries into ancient law. The primary 
objective of these inquiries—as it is well known—was to reveal the so called 
objective laws of development taken as valid (also) in the world of law, or 
rather—following the pattern of the Darwinian theory of evolution—to 
extend the scope of these laws of development to social phenomena. Based 
upon the inquiries into the so called primitive human communities including 
“ancient law”, Henry Maine could formulate his theory that interpreted the 
development of society as a progress from “status” to “contracts”.6 It can be 
taken as a result of the impregnatory effect of the points raised by him 
that a “comparative” as well as “historical” jurisprudence emerged. First in 
Germany and later all over Europe, those results also led to the establishment 
of another discipline—both comparative and historical—under the name 
of legal ethnology.7 So Maine’s works created a new and lasting link 
between law, history and anthropology.8 As a result of his works, the 
comparative method became a distinguished tool for legal studies. Even Maine 
himself considered that his inquiries radically turned away from the schools 
that dominated jurisprudence at the time. Maine saw the difference, or even 
the conflict between analytically and dogmatically oriented comparative 
law and his new comparative and historical jurisprudence manifested in 
the fact that whereas the inquiries of the latter concern the historical process 
or—using a more current term—the dynamics of law, the so-called 
comparative law analyzes the law given at a certain point of time, namely 
the static of law. Of course, that excluded the point taken also by Maine 

 
6
 Sumner, M. H.: Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society 
and Its Relation to Modern Ideas. London, 1861, 170 175. 
 
7
 Post, A. H.: Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz. Oldenburg-Leipzig, 
1894  "95. 
 
8
 Pollock, F.: Oxford Lectures and Other Discourses. London, 1890, 159. 
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and his followers as the supreme criterion of scientific quality: the search for 
the objective laws of development. Thus, comparative law as an application 
of the comparative method to the legal phenomena of a given period could 
play only a secondary, supporting role compared to the real science of law, 
to a jurisprudence historical and comparative in character. This way, in a sense, 
Maine transcended the standpoint of analytical-dogmatical jurisprudence 
concerning comparative law. While comparative law—as opposed to the 
properly so called jurisprudence—could mean only a method for the analytical-
dogmatical conception, for Maine, this contraposition manifested itself in 
the opposition on the one hand of comparative law not worthy of being 
regarded as an independent discipline and the “real”, historical and com-
parative jurisprudence centring around the idea of development, on the 
other. This way, Maine opened a way to recognize comparative law as a 
science. 
 Undoubtedly, it was F. Pollock, Maine’s disciple and successor in his 
scientific efforts who played the decisive role in synthesizing science and 
comparative law. Already in his inauguration lecture in Oxford, he took an 
oath continuing the work of his predecessor by pointing out that the theory of 
development is nothing but historical method applied to the facts of nature 
and the historical method is the theory of development applied to human 
societies and institutions.9 Connecting comparative and historical research is 
not only natural and desirable but necessary as well in the field of juris-
prudence. The task is not to confront the “static” point of view of comparative 
law with the “dynamic” approach but to apply in the world of law the two 
methods—namely the historical and the comparative—jointly, in a mutually 
complementary way. Jurisprudence itself must be both historical and 
comparative.10 Thus, comparative law plays not a “secondary” or “supporting” 
role: both historical and comparative jurisprudence has an independent 
place in the system of legal sciences.  
 
4. As opposed to this conception, an alternative way of establishing the 
scientific nature of comparative law was formulated on the first Inter-
national Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900). The new approach put 
forward on the Congress (by E. Lambert) claimed scientific independence for 

 
9
 Pollock, F.: English Opportunities in Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence. 
Oxford Inaugural Lecture, 1883. In: Oxford Lectures and Other Discourses. London, 
1890. 45. 
 
10
 Pollock, F.: The History of Comparative Jurisprudence. Journal of the Society 
of Comparative Legislation. New Series, vol. V., 1903. 914. 
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comparative law from the aspect of positive law or the disciplines of 
positive law that are more receptive to the needs of legal practice. Instead 
of searching for the objective laws of development of society and law, this 
approach put a practical objective in the centre: the promotion of the 
convergence of national legal systems by way of revealing the common 
basis (fonds commun) of legal institutions and legal concepts. The concept 
was underlined by Lambert with a historical analogy: just like before when, 
in an earlier phase of the development of European law, the integration of 
French and German local customs resulted in a “droit commun coutumier” 
and the “Deutsches Privatrecht” which could provide the basis for codification 
as a kind of “common law”, we, in a new phase of development based on the 
particular codified legal systems11  might or rather must establish a “common 
legislative law” (droit commun législatif) The function of comparative law 
(droit comparé) lies in the promotion of this process: comparing the positive 
law of nations that are on the same level of civilization might reveal the 
common features of the measures chosen in particular legal systems on the 
one hand, and the removable differences originating from the contingencies of 
historical development and not from the political or moral “attitude” of the 
given nation on the other. This is exactly the long-term objective of com-
parative law (droit comparé). 
 Lambert’s new conception concerning the nature and the objectives of 
comparative law that was put forward on the Congress of Paris did not give 
up entirely the results of the earlier, historical-comparative research. By 
the term “droit comparé” he exerted a dual classification. He distinguished 
comparative law based on historical and ethnological research and serving 
exclusively scientific and speculative objectives, searching for the universal 
laws of the life and providing an independent branch of social sciences on 
the one hand, and another positive branch of legal sciences on the other 
concentrating its inquiries on the common elements of legislation in 
particular states or rather the civilised nations taken as a “common legislative 
law”. This line of argumentation formulated in his report addressed to the 
Congress was later rectified by Lambert: he distinguished two independent 
disciplines that are relative to each other only in the application of the 
comparative method within the framework of the science named “droit 
comparé”. One forms a part of legal sociology under the name “comparative 
history” (histoire comparative) and searches for the causal relations and 

 
11
 Lambert, É.: Rapport général au Congrès International de Droit Comparé tenu à 
Paris du 31 juillet au 4 août 1900. In: Procès-verbaux des Séances et Documents. 
Tome premier. 32. 
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regularities of legal phenomena, while the other discipline, under the name 
“comparative legislation”, deals with the common elements of legal ideas and 
institutions, and, as a tool of lawmaking and the application of law, serves 
practical action.12 
 Today, one can definitely point out that the historical way of modern 
comparative law was determined by the latter meaning both in respect to 
the theoretical issues and the practical tasks. This latter meaning can provide 
the starting point in determining the place of comparative law as an 
independent discipline in legal education. 
 
 
III. 
 
5. The place and the role of comparative law in legal education is determined 
by two points. On the one hand, it functions as an invaluable tool of 
extending the general legal culture and the lawyer’s erudition. On the 
other, it mediates a kind of knowledge indispensable for practicing any legal 
profession. The joint and co-ordinate assertion of the two points—as it is 
well known—takes place in differing ways in different countries and even 
in different universities. The reasons for these differences are often con-
nected to basic conceptional differences concerning the objectives of legal 
education. 
 The priority of one conception that appears in many universities of Europe 
as a continuation of the common tradition of universities dating back to 
the middle ages is not to train “technicians of law” in the narrow sense of the 
term: on the contrary it seeks to provide a comprehensive general education 
that includes legal culture.13 It mediates a kind of universal knowledge 
beyond “professional” skills. It strives to educate lawyers who are able to 
recognize problems raised by the practice of their profession in their depth 
and social context, who are able to be aware of their responsibility and, by 
asserting a scale of values acquired and strengthened during their studies, to 
serve the cause of social progress. This might explain why certain subjects 
appearing in the curriculum do not have an obvious, immediate practical 
value, and prove their merit only in the long run (legal history, theory of 
law, philosophy of law, etc.). One can add to this list some social sciences 

 
12
 Lambert, É.: La fonction du droit civil comparé. Paris, 914. 
 
13
 David R.: Le droit comparé—enseignement du culture générale. Rapport presenté à 
la Conférence Commune du Comité International de Droit Comparé at the l’International 
Bar Association (juillet 1950). In: Rechtsvergleichung. Hrsg.: von K. Zweigert und 
H.–J. Puttfarken. Darmstadt, 1978. 206. 
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(economics, sociology, political science) the teaching of with seems to be 
necessary to understand the social environment of law. In a sense, this 
paradigm of education—that is characteristic mainly for the universities 
of the countries of the “civil law”—can be depicted as “non-professional” 
or “non-technical” for it is in many respects “philosophical” or, at least, 
“abstract” in nature. It concentrates not on the solution of “concrete” legal 
issues that are of primary importance for the legal practice, and not on the 
functioning of legal institutions, but on the clarification of the theoretical 
issues of law, on the establishment of the theory or the science of positive 
law. Of course, this does not exclude that one can put an emphasis on the 
social role of law as an instrument of human coexistence: it takes it as a 
starting point that this role can be better fulfilled with keeping an eye on 
universal contexts. Such an attitude—also naturally—presupposes an under-
standing of the nature of law that goes beyond the traditional positivist 
view of law, namely understanding law as a sum of rules and procedures. 
Clearly, this conception of legal education takes law as a science that has 
had established subjects, systems of terms, categorizations for centuries 
which, for that reason,—even if time to time requires additions or modifi-
cations—can be an independent subject of a legal education that is based 
upon these traditions. 
 The other conception that can be witnessed both in the world movement 
of comparative law and legal education—especially as a manifestation of 
the paradigm dominating in the United States—puts the primary emphasis 
on the needs of legal practice. It takes the lawyer—in the spirit of “social 
engineering”—as a person whose direct and everyday task is to solve the 
problems raised by the life of the society and who has at his disposal the 
professional and technical skills necessary to it. Thus, in a sense, the lawyer 
as an expert plays a key role in the formation of society, in arranging and 
attaining the necessary reforms. Legal education is also in the service of this 
cause: its objective is to prepare the young generation of lawyers from the 
very outset for their future social role, striving to train lawyers who are 
ready to work as lawyers right after their graduation. This conception pays 
less attention to the theoretical and the methodological issues of law, it 
rather puts the emphasis of education on teaching thoroughly the positive 
law, the actual operation of legal institutions, the role of law in the 
formation of society. Its function is to study the legal system in action, to 
evolve a critical view on it, and, moreover, to prepare the necessary reforms—
in the form of proposals aimed at improving the system. For this reason, its 
material can be taken as much less established or “settled”, it is much 
more open to modifications necessitated by social changes. Using an apt 
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expression, one could say that the emphasis is on how we teach rather than on 
what we teach.14 Instead of the issue of subject, the issue of method comes 
to the front: how we can develop in the student the ability to distinguish the 
relevant from the irrelevant, to handle the massive amount of facts before 
him, to argue in defence of his standpoint, to consider “pro” and ”contra” 
arguments, etc. Education is primarily directed to the development of these 
skills, contrary to the educational practice dominating the universities of the 
countries of “civil law” that provides knowledge, mediating a determined 
material of knowledge. 
 
6. The striking differences of the two conceptions are manifested even in 
the ways the tasks of legal education are understood and the questions of 
educational methods adapted to them are answered. The forms of legal 
education that serve rather practical objectives open the way to comparative 
law courses that are connected to the subject of particular positive branches 
or disciplines of law and that study them in a comparative way, by applying 
the comparative method. They deal with comparative law teaching instead 
of the teaching of comparative law. As opposed to this, for the conception 
that sees the function of legal education in mediating a comprehensive 
legal culture, it seems indispensable to provide a form of legal education 
(as well) that—being basically theoretical in character—is to clarify the 
nature, the objective and the method of comparative law. In this respect, it 
amounts to teaching of comparative law as an independent discipline. This 
would mean—as it was repeatedly put forward on various national and 
international fora—to initiate a so called introductory or basic course in 
legal education.15 
 The justification of such an introductory course is provided by the 
consideration that without it even the above mentioned other conception, 
namely discussing the material of positive law with a comparative method 
and view cannot lead to the desired outcome: to discernment relevant to 
the practice. Without proper theoretical and methodological foundations, 
students cannot gain a knowledge that allows for or, at least, facilitates 
the understanding of the substantial issues—concerning the objectives and 
the social functions of the given legal institution—behind the terminology 

 
14
 Merryman: op. cit. 866. 
 
15
 Schmidlin. B.: Der Beitrag der Rechtsvergleichung zum akademischen Unterricht. 
Eine Stellungnahme zu den Empfehlungen der vierten Europäischen Konferenz der 
Juristischen Fakultäten. Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung. 18. Jahrgang. Heft 4. 
1977. 241. 
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applied in particular legal systems. In such circumstances, one can hardly 
hope for the understanding of similarities and differences of institutional 
and technical measures applied in particular legal systems or in legal 
families, for the proper interpretation of their social role and function, and 
for the clarification of their practical consequences (for example, in respect to 
the various possibilities of the reception and the integration of laws). It 
hardly requires justification that this point is significant in regard to the 
tendencies of globalization today.  
 By now, it has become clear that even law cannot be taught in a “static” 
way in a world that generates fast changes. The particular legal institutions 
cannot be elucidated in their present form of appearance. The emphasis is 
placed right on the “dynamics”, namely the historical transformation and 
variability of institutions. However, the historical point of view and approach 
involves taking into account the past experiences beyond the present and 
the future, and the way of future development can be marked on the basis 
of the lessons of the past. In the formation of the future, past plays a role, 
and it is to be taken into consideration by legal education. 
 If we add to this the insight originating from practical experiences that 
textbooks of the subjects of positive law are rather lengthy even without 
references to foreign legal measures, and the fact that the limited time for 
education is a serious obstacle to referring to foreign law and the points of 
comparative law in teaching domestic law, the claim that it is necessary to 
“teach comparative law” in the form of an independent introductory course 
that goes beyond “comparative law teaching” appears to be legitimate. The 
justification of such a course—beyond the reference to the necessity of a 
more comprehensive legal culture as a scholarly argument—is reinforced 
from the aspect of the practice as well.16 This leads us to the conclusion 
that in respect to the spreading of comparative law in university education, 
we cannot be content with applying the comparative method in the course of 
particular subjects of positive law. In addition to this and as an establish-
ment of this, we think it is necessary to have a course dealing with the 
theoretical, methodological, historical issues of comparative law. It follows in 
a logical way from the independence of comparative law as a discipline. 
 Such an introductory course—according to an apt definition—is addressed 
to students who think it is necessary to integrate their knowledge on law 
into a cultural panorama expanding well beyond their own nation. It 

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and Comparative Law. American Journal of Comparative Law. Vol. 19. Number 4. 
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mediates a kind of knowledge that, apart from extending their legal culture, 
provides a more comprehensive foundation to the promotion of their career as 
lawyers. Accordingly, the course in question may consist of two parts.17 It 
introduces the world of comparative law to the students, makes them to 
understand the nature of comparative law, its objectives and functions, 
methods and history on the one hand, and gives a general overview of the 
main cultures or families of law on the other. Of course, within this general 
framework one can come up with a wide variety of measures concerning 
the ways of education, so it leaves open the opportunity of asserting the 
historical traditions of the given country and university or the paradigm 
dominating the education (or another one deviating from that), or even of 
attaining certain practical objectives. But all this belongs to the technical-
methodological issues of education only indirectly connected to our line 
of argument. 
 
 
IV. 
 
7. In Hungary, teaching of law including comparative law has old historical 
traditions.18 The European university—as it is well known—is an invention 
of the middle ages. According to the dominating paradigm of science of 
the time, it provided the framework for teaching the entirety of the sciences, 
namely theology, humanities, law and medicine. Lacking any domestic 
university, the Hungarian students initially attended foreign universities, 
especially in Padova, Bologna, Pavia and Paris. Later they preferred the 
Central European universities established in the 14th century (Prague, 
1348, Cracow, 1364, Vienna, 1365) but the first initiatives to establish 
universities in Hungary soon manifested themselves. Although we have 
only fragments of information on the first attempts to establish universities in 
Hungary in the middle ages (Pécs, 1367, Buda, 1395, Pozsony, 1467), it 
seems legitimate to claim on the basis of research in this field that these 
attempts included legal education following the Bologna model. However, 
as a consequence of the often stormy turns of Hungarian history of the 
time, these early initiatives proved rather short-lived.  
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 The same does not apply to the university established in Nagyszombat in 
the North of Hungary (1635) by Péter Pázmány, archbishop of Esztergom. 
We have detailed and exact information on it. The university that was 
originally named Studiorum Universitas had only a faculty of humanities 
in the beginning (1636), and later a further faculty for teaching theology 
(1638). The faculty of law was organized later (in 1667). On this faculty, 
besides the domestic customary law, canon law and Roman law were 
taught which one can interpret as a sign of an effort to create a kind of 
legal education transcending the framework of domestic law and to assert 
a more universal view of law if not an early manifestation of the idea of 
comparative law. Shortly after the foundation of the medical faculty (1769), 
the university moved to the capital, to the Castle of Buda (1777) by order 
of empress and queen Maria Theresa. Teaching began in 1780 there. The 
new order of university was settled by the educational regulation (Ratio 
Educationis) that was in force all over the Habsburg Empire in all types of 
schools. The regulation strove to assert the ideas of enlightened absolutism 
even in legal education. In regard to legal education, it was based on the 
German natural law theory of the time, especially the theory of Christian 
Wolff mediated by the distinguished professor from Nagyszombat: Karl 
Anton Martini. These conditions—just like in other European universities—
were not favourable to the spreading of the idea of comparative law for 
the acceptance of the idea of universal natural law put the emphasis on 
unity—and not diversity—in legal education. 
 The first steps towards modern comparative law were taken in the first 
quarter of the 19th century in the so called “reform era” when the interest 
in foreign laws and the claim to know and possibly take over foreign legal 
measures manifested itself. Although there were differences in respect to 
the search for the ways and the methods of social progress (in the sense 
that the camp of reformers was divided between the revolutionary French 
and the more moderate, traditionalist English way of development), in the 
eyes of the representatives—especially the lawyers—of both standpoints, 
comparative law was a tool of “modernizing” the Hungarian society and 
its legal system burdened with the remains of the feudal era. It appeared to 
them that the way of transcending the Hungarian legal system of their age 
based on customary law and burdened with feudal remnants must lead 
towards modernization through knowing and comparing foreign laws and 
drawing lessons from it. In this respect, the results of the French codifi-
cation that became known very early on provided a mobilizing force. It 
can hardly be seen as an accident that the French model gradually came to 
be dominant in the reform movement. 
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 These efforts took root in university education as well. Among the youth 
of the universities—and especially law students—there was a growing sense 
of dissatisfaction concerning traditional legal education, and the emotions 
of the revolution maturing in the entire Hungarian society had a decisive 
impact on the transformation of university life.19 It was a generally accepted 
requirement that university education including legal education should 
serve basically practical objectives, and, in this respect, the model to be 
followed (in regard to codification as well) were provided by the developed 
Western countries, especially France. Of course, it also paved the way to a 
better understanding of foreign laws and to comparative law in the modern 
sense of the term. However, the organizational and educational reforms 
necessitated by these tendencies did not take place in the reform era. 
Although the government of the revolution that broke out parallel to the 
revolutionary movements unfolding all over Europe in 1848 took the first 
steps in this direction, the events leading into an armed conflict had set 
back for a long time the cause of the reform of university education including 
legal curriculum. The conditions of the reform were not given until the 
compromise of 1867 with Austria. However, one can evaluate it as the 
survival of the efforts of the reform era that on the University of Pest 
teaching of comparative law was introduced in 1850.  
 The idea of comparative law, apart from university education, commanded 
attention to the theoretical aspects of the issue. In this respect, the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences founded in the reform era played an initiative role. 
A lecture given on a session of the department of philosophy and social 
sciences of the Academy characterized comparative law as one of the most 
important branches of the science of law which is to study “the legal life 
of the universal mankind”. According to the lecturer (Gusztáv Wenzel, 
professor at the Faculty of Law in the University of Pest), such an inquiry, 
besides pointing to the universal, common features of the development of 
law, should involve revealing the specific legal measures of the particular 
nations in order to get to the main principles of law and to promote the 
unification of “institutions and legal principles differing so much” as 
manifestations of the idea of law by way of comparing them.20 Perhaps, 
we might not be wrong in claiming that these ideas already involved an 
insight that later came to be generally accepted: it sees a difference between 
historical inquiries directed to the revelation of the universal laws of 
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Magyar Académiai Értesít . 1850. 292. 
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development forming one main branch of comparative law, and the activity 
committed to the needs of the practice and directed to the unification of 
law as the other. A quarter of a century later (1875), in another lecture 
also given in the Academy, Wenzel already put forward several ideas that 
are part of the paradigm of comparative law even today. Thus, he emphasized 
the importance of the distinction between the legal and the non-legal 
features to be taken into consideration by comparatists claiming that this 
distinction was to be asserted in comparing whole legal systems as well as 
their parts. He also pointed out that new scholarly results cannot be 
brought by comparison unless it takes place between the legal systems of 
nations comparable in respect to their cultural level.21 
 Among the results on this field, attempts to clarifying the comparability 
of the Hungarian law with Western legal system deserves special attention. 
The Hungarian legal system interwoven with feudal elements had several 
features—i.e. the lack of a written constitution, the delay in civil law 
codification, the recognition of customary law as a source of law and the 
role of courts in the developing the law—that resulted in differences not only 
in respect to the European way of the development of law but compared to 
other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as well. On the basis of 
these differences, the view that Hungarian law in its entirety and in regard 
to its historical traditions shows striking analogies to English law was put 
forward. Some thought that, to a certain extent, Hungarian law is independent 
of the Continental way of the development of law based upon the traditions 
of Roman law.22 On the basis of supposing such a “resemblance”—that is 
otherwise hardly justifiable and was criticized even in Hungarian juris-
prudence—, one could reach the conclusion that the Hungarian legal system—
just like the English one—belongs to the “self-lighted” (sui generis) legal 
systems that cannot fit into the framework of the comprehensive Roman-
Germanic tradition. 
 In the 20th century in Hungary—already adapting the results of the Congress 
of Paris that was a landmark in the modern comparative law movement—, 
there were attempts to define the nature of the science of comparative law 
using both natural law and positivism as starting points. As a consequence of 
these attempts, the point of view that understands the science of comparative 
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law as a branch of the science of positive law became dominant.23 There 
were successful initiatives to apply the comparative method to whole legal 
systems as well as branches of law and legal institutions. 
 
8. At the outset, the so called socialist jurisprudence faced several difficulties 
in regard to raising the idea of comparative law, and later in respect to 
making it accepted. As it is well known, the problem lied in the fact that 
socialist jurisprudence emphasized the qualitatively new character of the 
socialist type of law which cast doubt on the possibility of comparing the two 
conflicting types of law. Coupled with the distrust concerning any political 
ambition associated with the slogan of droit comparé, it had excluded all 
sorts of attempts of rapprochement for a long time. This situation had changed 
rather slowly but finally there evolved—both among the “Western” and the 
“Eastern” representatives of comparative law—an almost unanimous agreement 
concerning the possibility of comparing the law of countries of different 
social formations.24 In this respect, Hungarian comparatists played a significant 
and internationally recognized role. 
 In Hungarian jurisprudence, raising and answering the theoretical issues 
of the so called socialist comparative law mainly fell on the representatives of 
the theory of state and law—as a general, fundamental discipline. Professor 
Imre Szabó whose name is associated with most of the initiatives in this 
respect, originally joined the dominant, majority opinion in socialist juris-
prudence, and understood the comparative activity as one of the methods 
of revealing the phenomena of state and law.25 Later, he gradually changed 
his position finally arriving at the conclusion that results gained from the 
application of the comparative method add up to a general theory of 
comparative law.26 On Szabó’s initiative, a scientific conference jointly 
organized by the Hungarian Academy of sciences and the three legal faculties 
took place in December 1963 where the idea of the necessity of applying 
the comparative method in socialist jurisprudence and legal education was 
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put forward for the first time.27 This concept primarily concerned the legal 
systems of socialist countries, and manifested itself in the claim that 
socialist law is to be studied both on the level of “generality” (namely in 
respect to all socialist countries) and concretized on the particular legal 
systems. The positive law of the individual countries was understood as 
“particular” within the “general”. On the conference, it was also emphasized 
that such a “pan-socialist” approach did not release the jurists from the 
obligation to study carefully the domestic law. 
 These results gradually led to the spreading of the ideas of comparative 
law in legal education. As a consequence of the fundamental turn in the 
history of the country after 1945, the opportunities of getting informed 
concerning foreign laws were in the beginning rather limited—and basically 
limited to the soviet law and its development (this was indicated by the 
introduction of the new courses of Soviet law in the legal faculties). 
However, the “melting” in jurisprudence soon resulted in a turn even in 
university education. Although comparative law as an independent discipline 
did not become part of the compulsory curriculum of the university, however, 
there was a significant progress in this respect during the years to come. 
Thus, on the one hand, there appeared and optional courses discussing 
particular legal institutions of some branches of positive law from a 
comparative point of view and with the comparative method. This was 
undoubtedly an important step towards the teaching of comparative law. 
On the other hand—especially in the form of optional courses in the 
framework of the departments of legal theory—the teaching of the so 
called comparative law as an independent discipline took place in the form 
of an  course. The subject-matter of this introductory course was primarily 
provided by the products of the international comparative law literature 
that fit into this function and were at hand, but the experiences stemming 
from the international educational fora of comparative law were also made 
use. Accordingly, the programme of the basic course on comparative law 
is still adapted to the settled and internationally wide-spread educational 
paradigm on this field in the sense that the course, besides the theoretical, 
methodological and historical issues, includes the presentation of the main 
legal families. The main form of teaching is giving lectures by the teacher 
but the students themselves regularly hold lectures, and—in narrow circle, 
with the participation of students showing increased interest in comparative 
law—seminar-like professional discussions also take place. It is worthy of 
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mentioning that the growing interest in the issues of comparative law and 
foreign legal systems is manifested in the fact that the students often take 
advantage of the educational opportunities provided by foreign universities, 
and many of them attends the postgraduate courses of the International 
Faculty of Comparative Law in Strasbourg. Of course, it presupposes certain 
language skills on the part of the students which—partly as a consequence 
of the favourable political developments of the recent years—is manifested in 
the achieved results. 
 
 
